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The Pinochet Appeals Under Focus* 
Ian Brownlie, Q.C., Blackstone Chambers 
Honourable Chief Justice, Distinguished Justices, Mr. Chair­
man, Ladies and Gentlemen. First I would like to express my 
thanks to the Law Society for inviting me to Malta. 
The two House of Lords Appeals to be discussed are re­
ported as follows: 
First: [1998] 3 WLR 1456 
Second: [1999] 2 WLR 827 
By way of introduction the facts must be outlined. In the Sec­
ond Appeal they were presented as follows by the presiding 
Law Lord: 
On 11 September 1973 a right-wing coup evicted the left­
wing regime of President Allende. The coup was led by a 
military junta, of whom Senator ( then General) Pinochet was 
the leader. At some stage he became head of state. The 
Pinochet regime remained in power until 11 March 1990 
when Senator Pinochet resigned. 
There is no real dispute that during the period of the Sen­
ator Pinochet regime appalling acts of barbarism were com­
mitted in Chile and elsewhere in the world: torture, murder 
and the unexplained disappearance of individuals on a large 
scale. Although it is not alleged that Senator Pinochet himself 
committed any of those acts, it is alleged that they were done 
in pursuance of a conspiracy to which he was a party, at his 
instigation and with his knowledge. He denies these allegations. 
None of the conduct alleged was committed by or against cit­
izens of the United Kingdom or in the United Kingdom. 
In 1998 Senator Pinochet came to the United Kingdom for 
medical treatment. The judicial authorities in Spain sought to 
extradite him in order to stand trial in Spain on a large number 
of charges. Some of those charges had links with Spain. But 
most of the charges had no connection with Spain. The back­
ground to the case is that to those of left-wing political con­
victions Senator Pinochet is seen as an arch-devil: to those of 
right-wing persuasions he is seen as the saviour of Chile. It 
may well be thought that the trial of Senator Pinochet in Spain 
for offences all of which related to the State of Chile and most 
of which occurred in Chile is not calculated to achieve the best 
justice. But I cannot emphasize too strongly that this is no 
concern of your Lordships. Although others perceive our task 
as being to choose between the two sides on the grounds of 
personal preference or political inclination, that is an entire 
misconception. Our job is to decide two questions of law: are 
there any extradition crimes and if so, is Senator Pinochet im­
mune from trial for committing those crimes. If, as a matter 
of law, there are no extradition crimes or he is entitled to im­
munity in relation to whatever crimes there are, then there is 
no legal right to extradite Senator Pinochet to Spain or, in­
deed, to stand in the way of his return to Chile. If, on the 
other hand, there are extradition crimes in relation to which 
Senator Pinochet is not entitled to state immunity then it will 
be open to the Home Secretary to extradite him. The task of 
this House is only to decide those points of law. 
On 16 October 1998 an international warrant for the arrest 
of Senator Pinochet was issued in Spain. On the same day, a 
magistrate in London issued a provisional warrant ('the first 
warrant) under Section 8 of the Extradition Act 1989. He was 
arrested in a London hospital on 17 October 1998. On 18 Oc­
tober the Spanish authorities issued a second international war­
rant. 
Senator Pinochet started proceedings for habeas corpus and 
for leave to move for judicial review of both the first and the 
second provisional warrants. Those proceedings came before 
the Divisional Court (Lord Bingham of Cornhill CJ, Collins 
and Richards JJ .) which on 28 October 1998 quashed both war­
rants. Nothing turns on the first warrant which was quashed 
since no appeal was brought to this House. The grounds on 
which the Divisional Court quashed the second warrant were 
that Senator Pinochet ( as former head of state) was entitled to 
state immunity in respect of the acts with which he was charged. 
However, it has also been argued before the Divisional Court 
that certain of the crimes alleged in the second warrant were 
not 'extradition crimes' within the meaning of the Act of 1989 
because they were not crimes under UK law at the date they 
were committed. Whilst not determining this point directly, 
Lord Bingham of Cornhill CJ. held that, in order to be an ex­
tradition crime, it was not necessary that the conduct should 
be criminal at the date of the conduct relied upon but only at 
the date of request for extradition. 
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The Crown Prosecution Service (acting on behalf of the Gov­
ernment of Spain) appealed to this House with the leave of the 
Divisional Court. The Divisional Court certified the point of 
law of general importance as being 'the proper interpretation 
and scope of the immunity enjoyed by a former head of state 
from arrest and extradition proceedings in the United King­
dom in respect of acts committed while he was head of state.' 
Before the appeal came on for hearing in this House for the 
first time, on 4 November 1998 the Government of Spain sub­
mitted a formal request for extradition which greatly expand­
ed the list of crimes alleged in the second provisional warrant 
so as to allege a widespread conspiracy to take over the Gov­
ernment of Chile by a coup and thereafter to reduce the coun­
try to submission by committing genocide, murder, torture and 
the taking of hostages, such conduct taking place primarily in 
Chile but also elsewhere. 
The subject of this lecture is the family of issues concern­
ing the exercise of criminal jurisdiction in situations in 
which this involves the co-operation of other States and 
possible resort to international criminal courts. 
The background consists of the recognition of the exis­
tence of international crimes which attract the principle of 
universal jurisdiction. 
Such crimes include piracy, war crimes, crimes against 
humanity and torture. 
There are other forms of jurisdiction related to interna­
tional crimes, for example, on the basis of standard- setting 
conventions such as the Montreal Convention for the Sup­
pression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation 
of 1971. Such conventions adopt the principle of imposing the 
duty either to punish or to extradite. 
Ad hoc arrangements may be made by treaty as in the case 
of the trial of two suspects in the Lockerbie case by a Scot­
tish Court sitting at Camp Zeist in the Netherlands. 
A further development is the appearance of regional tri­
bunals such as the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia. 
And at least some States will accept the jurisdiction of the 
ICC created by the Rome Statute. 
Limitations on the procedure of extradition of suspects 
may derive from human rights standards, as in the Soering 
case, in which the European Court of Human Rights placed 
limits on extradition to the United States if the receiving ju­
risdiction exhibited the death-row phenomenon. 
By way of furtherintroduction, the role of municipal law 
has to be reckoned with. There is always a filter of local in­
stitutions and standards. Thus local constitutional principles 
may enforce the principle nulla poena sine lege. 
A connected question is the recognition of customary 
international law by municipal courts. In the absence of treaty 
provisions incorporated into English law the English courts 
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are reluctant to rely upon principles of customary law. The 
decisions of the House of Lords in the Pinochet Appeals hinged 
on the fact that the United Kingdom was a party to the Tor­
ture Convention. 
I shall present a short history of the proceedings. First, ob­
viously there was the Spanish Request on basis of the Euro­
pean Convention on Extradition. 
In the Divisional Court, Senator Pinochet applied for 
habeas corpus and leave for judicial review. Various issues of 
statutory construction arose and in the result the warrants of 
arrest were quashed. There was then an appeal by the Crown 
Prosecution Service acting on behalf of the Government of 
Spain. 
The first House of Lords Appeal involved six days of ar­
gument. The Decision was 3 : 2 in favour of the Government 
of Spain. There were interventions allowed at the special ap­
plication by Amnesty International and five other intervenors 
on the basis of having the right to speak. Human Rights Watch 
was also allowed to intervene but on the basis of written ar­
gument and Mr David Lloyd-Jones QC appeared as amicus 
curiae. 
In January 1999 there were some special proceedings. The 
First Appeal was annulled. This was on account of the dis­
qualification of Lord Hoffmann for having a non-pecuniary 
interest in the outcome of the case. He had the status of the 
trustee of a charitable foundation supporting Amnesty Interna­
tional, my client.And so the appeal then had to be heard again. 
So in the Second Appeal we had twelve days of hearings. 
The decision this time was 6 : 1 in favour of the Government of 
Spain. The Intervenors were the same as before, but the Gov­
ernment of Chile was also permitted to intervene in the Sec­
ond Appeal. 
These were interesting questions as to the status of the 
First Appeal in the second hearings. The first Appeal had been 
formally set aside. However, it had been published in the 
Weekly Law Reports and it had appeared also on the desks 
of the Judges in the Second Appeal. During the proceedings 
of the Second Appeal, it seemed to everyone common sense 
to refer to the speeches of the Law Lords in the first Appeal 
as a shorthand way of discussing the different aspects of the 
arguments. I think common sense prevailed. 
The last step I regret to say was the ultimate decision of 
the Home Secretary, given in a letter to the Spanish Ambas­
sador. On the basis of an independent medical report, it had 
been decided that in a criminal trial in England, Senator Pino­
chet would be found unfit to stand trial. On this basis it was 
said that a fair trial would not be possible either in England 
or elsewhere. Consequently Senator Pinochet was permitted 
to return to Chile. 
The offences charged in Spain were as follows (in terms 
of the English equivalents) The first was Genocide under the 
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Genocide Act, 1969. The second was Torture; under Section 
134 of the Criminal Justice Act, 1985. The third, hostage-tak­
ing under the Taking of Hostages Act, 1972 and fourth, con­
spiracy to murder under the Criminal Law Act, 1977. 
The various positions adopted by the Law Lords in the 
two Appeals can now be summarized. 
A. The conservative approach upholding immunity was adopt­
ed in the Speeches of Lords Slynn, Lloyd, and Goff.
B. The treatment of the act of State issue: The Law Lords did 
take an interest in the Act of State in the First Appeal but
they did not regard it as relevant in the second Appeal. The
presiding Law Lord, Lord Browne-Wilkinson told Coun­
sel that they were not interested in the argument on the act
of state. The principle explained was that if as in the law of
extradition there is a clear matrix of law governing the
subject, then there should be no role for something as am­
bivalent and vague as the act of State doctrine. So the act
of State doctrine played no role in the Second Appeal.
C. Then there was the majority position, a strong majority
position in the Second Appeal denied immunity by 6 votes
to 1.
D. Lastly there was the position adopted by Lords Millett
and Phillips, who took the view that there was no immu­
nity even prior to the coming into force of the Torture
Convention.
The statutory context of immunity must be explained. The 
context was the State Immunity Act 1978. 
Part I: Section 16 ( 1) provides that nothing in Part I of the 
Act is to apply to criminal proceedings, and thus Part I is not 
applicable. 
But Part III of the Act contains Section 20 ( 1) which pro-
vides: 
Subject to ... any necessary modifications, the Diplomatic 
Privileges Act 1964 shall apply to -
(a) a sovereign or other Head of State ...
as it applies to a head of diplomatic mission.
This involves a reference to Article 39 (2) of the Vienna Con­
vention on Diplomatic Relations, 1961 but there are difficul­
ties in applying these provisions to a former Head of State. 
The next question is 'What is an Extradition Crime?' This 
involves the construction of Section 2 of Extradition Act, 1989. 
The material date is that of the conduct, not the request 
for extradition. Thus the Second Appeal involved a change in 
view from the First Appeal. 
The Torture Convention was ratified by the UK on 8 De­
cember 1988 following the coming into force of section 134 
of the Criminal Justice Act 1988. 
The requirement in Section 2 that the alleged conduct, the 
subjec� of the request, be a crime under UK law as well as the 
law of the requesting State involved the condition that the con­
duct be a crime in the UK at the time when the alleged offence 
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was committed. This principle eliminated charges relating to 
alleged crimes committed before 1988. And so although the 
appeal succeeded in the Second Appeal in terms of the quan­
tity of charges, it was not a substantial victory. 
Was there an obligation to extradite those suspected of 
crimes under customary or general international law? 
• The key question is whether the law recognizes such a
duty.
• Much of the literature is silent on the question and the in­
ference must be that the doctrine is reluctant to recog­
nize such a duty. It is also to be recalled that the relevant
resolution of the Institut de Droit International at the
Cambridge Session in 1983, Annuaire, Vol. 60, Part II,
makes no reference to international crimes.
• My preference is for the view that there is a duty to ex­
tradite those suspected of international crimes. This is a
duty under general customary international law.
• This view is supported by a small number of writers, for
example,
(a) Sir Hersch Lauterpacht, as the editor of Oppenheim,
Vol. II, ih ed., 1952, pp. 588-9.
• He also expressed a similar view in an article in the
British Yearbook, in 21 BYIL (1944), pp. 93-5.
(b) The present speaker who expressed this view in Prin­
ciples, l 8t ed., 1966,p.268.,Principles,5th ed., 1998,p.318.
The case for the duty of extradition under general interna­
tional law is quite simple. If a certain action is established as 
a crime under customary international law, the duty to ex­
tradite appears as a necessary corollary of such a principle. 
I tum now to the difficulties which have prevented the 
acceptance or establishment of the corollary. 
First, there is the assumption that the duty to extradite must 
consist of an autonomous principle which is developing sep­
arately in customary law, but has not yet crystallized. 
Secondly, it is asserted that there is no international crime 
in existence unless certain pre-conditions are satisfied, such 
as the existence of universal jurisdiction in respect of the in­
ternational crime concerned. 
Lord Hope in the second Pinochet Appeal places empha­
sis on the criterion that the prohibition of the acts concerned 
should have acquired the status of jus co gens. 
It is not clear to me that either of these two pre-condi­
tions is a necessary condition of a duty to extradite. 
The essential problem here seems to be that of the sources 
of International Law. 
Can a principle of customary law have a purely logical ex­
tension? Thus, if an international crime is involved, logically 
there should be a duty to extradite. 
Similar difficulties occur in relation to the question of 
the immunity of former or serving Heads of State. In other 
words, is there a necessary corollary, in this case denying 
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immunity, which flows from the status of the act, for which 
extradition is called for, as an international crime. 
On the basis of such a corollary, the question of immuni­
ty as such does not arise. If the Head of State is charged with 
an international crime, the question of immunity is a non-issue. 
Seen in this way the problem becomes one of legal character­
ization and priority, as between different legal principles. 
Unfortunately, the legal sources do not always assess the 
situation in this way. 
The strange circumstance is that the standard authorities, 
and nearly all the cases, relate to the immunity of the State 
itself in civil cases, and not the immunity of individuals in 
criminal proceedings. 
The trial ofEichmann (1962), the case of Demjanjuk v. Petro­
vsky ( 1985), and the Honecker ( 1984) case are exceptional. 
Moreover, as precedents, these decisions have idiosyncrasies. 
The more significant evidence of the position in general 
international law must now be examined. 
1. There is the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal, 1945,
Art. 7, according to which
the official position of defendants, whether as a Head of 
State or responsible officials in Government Departments 
shall not be considered as freeing them from responsibil­
ity or mitigating punishment. 
2. On 11 December 1946 the General Assembly of the Unit­
ed Nations adopted the following Resolution (Resol. 95
(1)):
Affirms the principles of international law recognized by 
the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal and the judgment 
of the Tribunal. 
Directs the Committee on the codification of internation­
al law established by the resolution of the General Assem­
bly of 11 December, 1946, to treat as a matter of primary 
importance plans for the formulation, in the context of a gen­
eral codification of offences against the peace and security 
of mankind, or of an International Criminal Code, of the 
principles recognized in the Charter of the Nuremberg Tri­
bunal and in the judgment of the Tribunal. 
The Resolution is declaratory in form and was adopted 
unanimously in a General Assembly consisting of 51 
States. It was a vehicle for the expression of State prac­
tice. This development is reported with approval in 1992 
by the editors of Oppenheim's International Law (9th ed.: by
Sir Robert Jennings and Sir Arthur Watts), pp. 505-506. 
3. The Tokyo Charter (Charter of the International Military
Tribunal for the Far East), dated 26 April 1946, provid­
ed in Article 6:
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Responsibility of Accused. Neither the official position, at 
any time, of an accused, nor the fact that an accused acted 
pursuant to order of his government or of a superior shall, 
of itself, be sufficient to free such accused from responsibil-
ity for any crime with which he is charged, but such circum­
stances may be considered in mitigation of punishment if 
the Tribunal determines that justice so requires. 
4. The United Nations General Assembly Resolution 3074
of 1973, which proclaimed (inter alia) the following prin­
ciples:
1. War crimes and crimes against humanity, wherever they
are committed, shall be subject to investigation and the
persons against whom there is evidence that they have
committed such crimes shall be subject to tracing, ar­
rest, trial and, if found guilty, to punishment.
4. States shall assist each other in detecting, arresting and
bringing to trial persons suspected of having committed
such crimes and, if they are found guilty, in punishing
them.
8. States shall not take any legislative or other measures
which may be prejudicial to the international obligations
they have assumed in regard to the detection, arrest, ex­
tradition and punishment of persons guilty of war crimes
and crimes against humanity.
5. The Statute of the International Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia, adopted by the Security Council in 1993, pro­
vides as follows in Article 7:
'Article 7. Individual criminal responsibility 
1. A person who planned, instigated, ordered, committed or
otherwise aided and abetted in the planning, preparation
or execution of a crime referred to in articles 2 to 5 of the
present Statute, shall be individually responsible for the
crime.
2. The official position of any accused person, whether as
Head of State or Government or as a responsible Govern­
ment official, shall not relieve such person of criminal
responsibility nor mitigate punishment.
3. The fact that any of the acts referred to in articles 2 to 5
of the present Statute was committed by a subordinate
does not relieve his superior of criminal responsibility if
he knew or had reason to know that the subordinate was
about to commit such acts or had done so and the superi­
or failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to
prevent such acts or to punish the perpetrators thereof.
4. The fact that an accused person acted pursuant to an order
of a Government or of a superior shall not relieve him of
criminal responsibility, but may be considered in mitiga­
tion of punishment if the International Tribunal deter­
mines that justice so requires.
(In addition Article 9 gives the International Tribunal and 
States' national courts concurrent jurisdiction.) 
6. The Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda,
adopted by the United Nations Security Council in 1994,
which contains the same clause (Article 6) (and also pro­
vides for concurrent jurisdiction: Article 8).
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And lastly 
7. The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,
adopted by 120 states in July 1998 (and signed, inter alia,
by the United Kingdom, Spain and Chile), which pro­
vides as follows (in Article 27 (1)):
Irrelevance of official capacity 
1. This Statute shall apply equally to all persons without any
distinction based on official capacity. In particular, offi­
cial capacity as a Head of State or Government, a mem­
ber of a Government or parliament, an elected represen­
tative or a government official shall in no case exempt
a person from criminal responsibility under this Statute,
nor shall it, in and of itself, constitute a ground for re­
duction of sentence.
The more cautious Law Lords regarded these Treaty pro­
visions simply as special instances of jurisdiction and 
not as evidence of emergent principles of general or cus­
tomary international law. 
The issues facing the English Courts can now be summa­
rized. 
1. The request of the Government of Spain by virtue of the
European Convention on Extradition.
2. As a consequence, the Extradition Act 1989 applies.
Do the crimes alleged constitute extradition crimes?
3. The Home Secretary did not authorize the proceedings to
go ahead on the charge of genocide.
4. The identification of extradition crimes involved a tem­
poral criterion which could be either the date of the re­
quest for extradition or the date of the conduct.
The conclusion of the Law Lords was that the conduct must 
be a crime under English law at the conduct date and not at 
the date the request for extradition was made. 
5. In the result:-
(a) Genocide had already been dropped by the Home Sec­
retary.
(b) There was no evidence of hostage-taking.
( c) Charges of murder and conspiracy to murder were ex­
traditable crimes, provided the murders took place in
Spain.
( d) Torture was an extradition crime after 1988 when Sec­
tion 134 of the Criminal Justice Act came into effect.
6. Immunity from criminal jurisdiction existed under UK
legislation but not in respect of international crimes and
thus the immunity ratione materiae normally applicable
to former Heads of State does not apply.
7. The more specific conditions for removal of immunity
for Heads of State were as follows:
(a) The UK and Chile are parties to the Torture Conven­
tion.
(b) Torture must be a crime under English law at the date
of the conduct alleged.
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8. The Torture Convention did not preserve immunity ratione
materiae.
The other view of this was expressed by Lord Goff, who
was a rather lone dissenter in the second Appeal. He 
took the position that waiver of immunity by treaty 
must be express. 
An important point of interpretation was involved 
here: was it reasonable to assume that the draftsmen of 
the Torture Convention accepted that the senior offi­
cials who are those most likely to authorize torture 
would be immune from responsibility? If that were the 
case, the Convention would be to a great extent nuga­
tory. This point of interpretation played a major role 
in the proceedings. 
I shall now move on to examine the Obligation to Extradite 
Those suspected of International Crimes under Customary 
Law - as seen in the House of Lords. 
In the House of Lords' first Appeal 
• Lord Slynn stated that crimes against humanity were
recognized since 1946 but no rule as to the restriction of
immunity had emerged. (pp. 1473-4).
• Lord Lloyd took the view that immunity was accepted by
virtue of well established principles of customary law.
(pp. 1488-91)
• Lord Nicholls stated that crimes against humanity had
existed since 1946 and no immunity was accepted as a
consequence. (pp. 1500-2)
• Lord Steyn took a sharper view (p. 1506). At least since
1973 genocide, torture, hostage-taking, and crimes against
humanity were recognized (p. 1508). Consequently no im­
munity was available.
• Lord Hoffmann simply agreed with Nicholls and Steyn.
There is a certain oddity about the speeches in the first appeal.
The most lengthy and well articulated speech was by Lord
Slynn, who was in a minority. The speech by Nicholls was
relatively short and so was Lord Steyn's. Hoffmann simply
agreed with the other two.
A key distinction in the Appeals was between the two 
types of immunity. 
The first type, immunity ratione personae, attaches to the 
person of the official while he is in post as a Head of State 
or diplomat. It is an immunity linked to status. 
The second type, immunity ratione materiae, attaches to 
the official acts of States and is related not to the person but 
to the subject-matter and thus it is a subject-matter immu­
nity. Normally, this immunity survives the loss of office by 
the Head of State or diplomat. 
In the Second Appeal the majority view was that ex­
Heads of State did not have the protection of immunity ra­
tione materiae. 
1. Lord Browne-Wilkinson, (pp. 844-8) held that if Pinochet
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organized and authorized torture after 8 December 1988, 
he 
was not acting in any capacity which gives rise to immunity 
ratione materiae because such acts were contrary to inter­
national law. 
2. Lord Hope, (pp. 879-87 at p. 886-7) was of the view that
there was no protection in respect of crimes committed
after ratification of the Torture Convention.
3. Lord Hutton, (pp. 887-902 / pp. 898-9) adopted the same
position.
4. Lord Saville, (pp. 902-4) held that as the result of the Con­
vention, States had agreed to the exercise of jurisdiction
and that there was no immunity ratione materiae (p. 903).
5. Lord Millett, (pp. 905-14 at p.913) was of the view that
as a result of the Torture Convention there was no im­
munity.
6. Lord Phillips, (pp. 920-25) held that the Convention was
incompatible with the applicability of immunity ratione
materiae.
The Law Lords in the Second Appeal had different positions 
both on the criteria for the development of international crimes 
in customary law and on the degree of the immunity. The 
question may be asked "What was the most radical position 
adopted?" Even the less conservative Law Lords still ac­
cepted the application of immunity ratione personae. 
Lord Millett still accepted that immunity ratione person­
ae applies, even though he was the least conservative of the 
Law Lords in the Second Appeal (p. 905; p. 913). 
Lord Phillips was of a similar opinion (pp. 923-7). 
Lords Hutton and Phillips emphasize that the standard is 
set by International Law. Thus torture cannot constitute acts 
committed in performance of the official functions of a head 
of State. (See also Lord Steyn in the first Appeal (pp. 1505-7), 
Lord Millett (pp. 913-4), Lord Nichols, p.1501). But all the 
Law Lords recognized the principle of immunity rationae per­
sonae and that was a concession made by Counsel on behalf 
of the Government of Spain. 
However, the principle emphasized by Lord Phillips 
should in principle apply also to serving Heads of State. 
This was the position of Amnesty International in the Ap­
peals. 
Furthermore, the majority of the Law Lords held that the 
Torture Convention did not preserve immunity ratione ma­
teriae. But is it not equally possible that it does not preserve 
immunity ratione personae? 
The positions adopted in the Second Appeal were direct­
ly related to the special characteristics of the crime of tor­
ture and the prohibition of torture as a form of jus co gens. 
However, it is difficult to restrict the reasoning exclusive­
ly to the case of torture. It is difficult to see why genocide or 
hostage-taking should be treated differently. 
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As I near my conclusion, it is necessary to emphasize the 
complex interests involved in extradition cases relating to 
international crimes. 
First, there is the Rule of law interest. 
This is directed to the goals of ensuring that the extradi­
tion process is applied in accordance with the law, and also 
that the rights of the suspect are sufficiently protected. 
Secondly, there is the possible interest of the State of the 
forum in trying the offences concerned. 
And, thirdly, there is the interest of the requesting State, in 
this case Spain. 
There is, however, the interest of third States other than 
the requesting State. The preponderance of the crimes asso­
ciated with the Pinochet regime were committed in Chile. 
The Chilean interest was recognized in that in the Second 
Appeal the House of Lords permitted the Chilean Govern­
ment to appear as an intervenor. It is also the case that many 
Chileans who were opponents or victims of the Pinochet Gov­
ernment believed that he should be tried in Chile and not in 
the Spain. 
By way of conclusion it is necessary to utter a caution. 
The logic of the decision of the House of Lords in the Second 
Appeal, inexorable though it appears to be, is not yet gener­
ally accepted. 
Two pieces of evidence may be adduced for this view. 
The first is the resolution adopted by the Institut de Droit 
International at the Vancouver Session last year, entitled Im­
munities from Jurisdiction and Measures of Execution of 
Heads of State and Former Heads of State in International 
Law. This resolution is very conservative in essence and 
continues to recognize the immunities of Serving Heads of 
State. 
The second piece of evidence consists of three recent de­
cisions of the European Court of Human Rights in which the 
Grand Chamber of the Court accepted that the right to a fair 
hearing in accordance with Article 6 of the European Con­
vention had not been breached where State immunity had pre­
vented the Applicants from pursuing cases in the domestic 
courts. 
Thus, the Court observed that 
In al-Adsani, while noting the growing recognition of the 
overriding importance of the prohibition of torture, the Court 
did not find it established that there was yet acceptance in 
international law of the proposition that states were not en­
titled to immunity in respect of civil claims for damages for 
alleged torture committed outside the forum state. 
The 1978 Act which granted immunity to states in respect 
of personal injury claims unless the damage was caused with­
in the United Kingdom, was not inconsistent with those 
limitations generally accepted by the community of nations 
as part of the doctrine of state immunity. 
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The application by the English courts of the provisions of 
the 1978 Act to uphold Kuwait's claim to immunity could 
not, therefore, be said to have amounted to an unjustified re­
striction on the applicant's access to court. It followed that 
there had been no violation of article 6.1. 
Judges Rozakis, Caflisch, Wildhaber, Costa, Cabral Bar-
reto, Vajic, Ferrari Bravo and Loucaides dissented. 
One final observation is called for. A depressing aspect of 
the subject of extradition is the extent to which consistency 
in approach is subject to political circumstance and discre­
tionary elements even in Rule of law States. Thus, there is a 
regional jurisdiction for the International Criminal Tribunal 
for the Former Yugoslavia and also one for Rwanda but not for 
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other regions or situations. And even multilateral standard­
setting conventions may be the subject of compromise, as 
in the Lockerbie case. 
In conclusion there was a strong logical case for the denial 
of immunity both in relation to former and to serving heads of 
state. This was the position of Amnesty in the two House of 
Lords appeals. Unfortunately as we have seen, this position is 
not yet reflected in the sources of Customary International 
Law. The relevant majority of the House of Lords did not ap­
prove of the view that immunity could be restricted as a con­
sequence of the principles of customary international law as 
opposed to express Treaty obligations. 
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